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Abstract

Purpose: This article explores the tension between the concept of a Designated Community as a
foundational element in Trustworthy Digital Repository certification and curators’ uncertainty about
how to interpret and apply this concept in practice.
Design/methodology/approach: This research employs a qualitative research design involving indepth semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the Trustworthy Digital Repository Audit and
Certification process.
Findings: Our findings indicate that stakeholders in the audit and certification process viewed their
uncertainty about how to apply the concept of a Designated Community in the context of an audit as
a source of risk for digital repositories and their collections.
Originality: This article brings new insights to digital preservation by applying social theories of
risk to trustworthy digital repository audit and certification processes, with an emphasis on the
concept of Designated Community.
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Introduction

Digital repositories are places where the important work of preserving digital content takes place.
There are many decisions that people who do this work have to make, but one of the most
important is deciding who should be able to access, understand, and use the information that they
are preserving. This decision drives many other choices and as such can have an outsized
influence on preservation processes and can determine the success of digital preservation efforts.
A basic definition of Designated Community (DC) is: the group or groups of consumers for
whom a digital repository is preserving information. A key reason for defining a DC is to set
parameters for repository staff as they make preservation decisions. This concept was introduced
in the Open Archival Information System (OAIS) model (Consultative Committee for Space Data
Systems, 2012), and is foundational to several systems for trustworthy digital repository (TDR)
audit and certification, including Trustworthy Digital Repository Audit and Certification
(TRAC), ISO 16363, CoreTrustSeal, and nestor (Consultative Committee for Space Data
Systems, 2011, 2012; CoreTrustSeal Standards and Certification Board, 2019; nestor Working
Group Trusted Repositories - Certification, 2009; RLG-NARA Digital Repository Certification
Task Force, 2007). In each of these systems, a repository is expected to clearly define the group
of future consumers who should be able to access and understand the repository’s preserved
digital content. Other repository policies and practices are evaluated in terms of how well they
meet the needs of the DC.
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Despite the centrality of this concept for repository certification, the DC is poorly understood.
We argue that uncertainty about the DC in the context of a repository audit influences the ways in
which stakeholders construct their understanding of risk, focusing on TRAC certification.
In this article we explore the tension between the centrality of DCs in the TRAC certification
process on one hand, and the uncertainty about how to apply this concept in practice on the other.
We ask:
1. How do stakeholders in TDR certification understand the concept of the DC?
2. How do those stakeholders construct their understanding of risk with regard to DCs?
Our findings indicate that: (1) standard developers and auditors viewed the DC as a
foundational element of the TRAC certification process, (2) standard developers, auditors, and
repository staff members who discussed DCs expressed uncertainty about the concept, including
how to interpret this requirement for repositories in the context of certification, and (3)
uncertainty about the DC concept was described as a source of risk for digital repositories.
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Background/Literature Review

2.1 Designated Communities

The concept of a DC was introduced in the OAIS model (i.e., ISO 14721), which outlines
requirements for digital repositories that engage in long-term preservation (Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012). The OAIS model forms the basis for several TDR
certification processes, which all take different approaches to evaluating how well a given
repository conforms to the OAIS model. In this article we focus on the role that the DC plays in
TRAC certification, a process discussed in greater detail below.
The OAIS model defines DC as:
“An identified group of potential Consumers who should be able to understand a
particular set of information. The Designated Community may be composed of
multiple user communities. A Designated Community is defined by the Archive and
this definition may change over time.” (Consultative Committee for Space Data
Systems, 2012, pp. 1–11)
There are two key elements to this definition that we would like to emphasize: first, the DC
refers to potential consumers, which means that members of the DC do not necessarily act as
immediate consumers of the information but rather are people or systems who should be able to
access and use this information at some point in the future, because “the primary goal of an OAIS
is to preserve information for a Designated Community over an indefinite period of time”
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, pp. 4–20). Second, the DC should not
be seen as one static group of future consumers but may consist of multiple communities or
systems that “share an identifiable set of characteristics which can be used as a reference when
executing curation or preservation actions” (Moles, 2019, p. 24). This means that the DC can
include current users – people or systems – but there is an emphasis on potential rather than
current use for decision making.
The DC forms the basis for preservation decisions. Choices about, for example, which
representation information to capture, which modes of access to support, and which file formats
to use, depend on what will best meet the needs and expectations of the DC. As such, having a
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well-defined DC, that repository stakeholders understand, is important for a repository whose
staff want to demonstrate compliance with the OAIS model through TDR certification.
The set of characteristics that a DC shares is referred to as the Knowledge Base (KB). A KB
is “a set of information, incorporated by a person or system, that allows that person or system to
understand received information” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2012, pp. 1–
12). The OAIS model recommends that repository staff regularly review the DC, in part because
they may wish to redefine their repository’s DC, and in part because the KB of a DC can change
over time (e.g., Donaldson et al., 2020).
Changes to the DC and/or the KB can necessitate changes or additions to the representation
information (e.g., metadata) in order to ensure that the DC will be able to understand the
repository’s information in the future (e.g., Parsons and Duerr, 2006). The Monitor Designated
Community function of the OAIS model emphasizes that repository staff should focus on changes
in technology uses and requirements, and that they can gather this information through the use of
surveys, workshops or other forms of interaction with the user base (Consultative Committee for
Space Data Systems, 2012, pp. 4–14). While this does provide some information about how
digital repository staff could track changes in the KB of their DC over time, it has been criticized
as vague (e.g., Donaldson et al., 2020).
Information about how to implement the DC in practice is sparse. The lack of information
about how to apply this concept has been noted by several studies (e.g., Bettivia, 2016;
Donaldson et al., 2020; Kärberg, 2014; Locher, 2017; Moles, 2022; Parsons and Duerr, 2006).
Scholarship that emphasizes the importance of the DC for long-term preservation largely aligns
with the definitions in the OAIS model, but does not address arguments about the impracticality
of implementing the DC (e.g., Bountouri et al., 2018; Clarke and Shiue, 2020; Giaretta, 2011).
Some have described implementations of the DC that are overly broad or that conflate the DC
with a repository’s current users (e.g., Baker et al., 2015).
In the absence of clear guidance about how to identify and define the DC, several scholars
have attempted to create frameworks to help repository staff identify and define the DC for their
own organizations (e.g., Donaldson et al., 2020; Kärberg, 2014; Kim, 2015; Parsons and Duerr,
2006). Locher (2017) and Kärberg (2014) both argue that repositories should systematically study
current repository users in order to establish a definition of their DC. Donaldson et al., (2020)
argue that a key responsibility of a repository or archive is to preserve information for its DC, and
provide an example of a repository whose DC changed over time.
Several scholars have identified the exclusionary nature of DC as problematic for memory
institutions that serve broad publics (e.g., Bettivia, 2016; Bishop and Hank, 2016; Moles, 2019).
From this perspective, repositories that explicitly seek to meet the needs of only some users or
consumers necessarily privilege groups that they already understand while excluding groups with
whom they are less familiar. This is closely linked to the notion that digital preservation is the act
of making digital information usable for someone. As Bettivia argues, the OAIS model is one in
which “Designated Communities are bound together with the assumption of preservation for
someone rather than preservation of something” (Bettivia, 2016, p. 3). This emphasis on making
sure that members of a specific community can use and understand digital information in the
future has the potential to reinforce the perspectives of repository staff who must decide for
whom they are preserving this information, rather than making the information in repositories
accessible to groups who have traditionally not been served by memory institutions.
The overall picture is that DC is a term with a broad definition, that is foundational for
repositories wishing to implement and demonstrate compliance with the OAIS model.
Scholarship about DC consistently identifies the problem of being encouraged to define the DC
broadly, while also being asked to maintain highly detailed information about the DC, their KB,
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and information needs (e.g., Parsons and Duerr, 2006). It is impractical for repository staff. It
encourages repositories to define their DC narrowly, in line with what they can reasonably define
and describe. This, in turn, leads to DCs that are exclusionary and in conflict with the mission of
cultural heritage institutions that serve broad publics (Bettivia, 2016; Moles, 2022; Parsons and
Duerr, 2006). All of this creates uncertainty for repositories seeking to follow the OAIS model.

2.2 Risk in Trustworthy Digital Repository Audit and Certification

There are several avenues for digital repositories to pursue certification as trustworthy. Processes
such as CoreTrustSeal, nestor, and TRAC rely on similar criteria, which are intended to assess
trustworthiness for long-term preservation by evaluating whether a repository’s policies and
practices align with the OAIS model through the use of a requirements checklist (Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems, 2011, 2012; CoreTrustSeal Standards and Certification
Board, 2019; nestor Certification Working Group, 2013). This paper focuses on the TRAC
certification system, as administered by the Center for Research Libraries (CRL).
TRAC was a joint effort by CRL, the Research Libraries Group (RLG), the National Archives
and Records administration (NARA), and Consultative Committee for Space Data Standards
(CCSDS) (Yakel, 2007). The Trustworthy Repositories Audit and Certification (TRAC): Criteria
Checklist was created in 2007 (RLG-NARA Digital Repository Certification Task Force, 2007),
and the ISO 16363 standard was approved in 2012 and confirmed in 2017 (Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems, 2011). CRL conducted audits to assess the trustworthiness of
digital repositories using the TRAC checklist from 2010-2014, and continued to maintain those
certifications over time until at least 2018 (e.g., Center for Research Libraries, 2018).
Through TRAC certification, repositories demonstrate their trustworthiness regarding the
long-term preservation of digital information. In order to do so, they show documentary evidence
of risk assessment and mitigation efforts, which is reviewed by external auditors (Frank, 2022).
The ISO 16363 standard states:
“A trustworthy digital repository will understand threats to and risks within its
systems. Constant monitoring, planning, and maintenance, as well as conscious
actions and strategy implementation will be required of repositories to carry out their
mission of digital preservation.” (Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems,
2011, pp. 2–11)
Despite the centrality of risk for repository certification, research has focused on concepts such as
trustworthiness rather than risk (e.g., Bak, 2016; Dryden, 2011; Faundeen, 2017).
Some research about TDR certification processes such as TRAC has been optimistic, arguing
that certification ensures that the institutions tasked with caring for valuable data and information
are suited to the task (e.g., Giaretta et al., 2011; Husen et al., 2017; Reilly, Jr. and Waltz, 2013).
Organizations publish reports of their efforts to achieve certification or to otherwise demonstrate
compliance with the TRAC/ISO 16363 standard outside of formal certification (e.g., Phillips et
al., 2015). And repositories that have successfully achieved TRAC certification published
accounts of their experience (e.g., CLOCKSS, 2014; Kirchhoff et al., 2010).
Despite these positive views, scholars in recent years have begun to question the value
proposition of repository certification (Bak, 2016) and whether certification processes sufficiently
consider all relevant criteria (Abrams, 2021). In 2020 Donaldson observed:
“In reality, we do not know if audit and certification of TDRs actually matters. For
example, we do not know if digital repositories are actually better at preserving
5

digital information after certification than they were before. Additionally, we do not
know if TDRs preserve digital information better than their counterparts, although
TDR standards definitely promulgate this assumption.” (Donaldson, 2020, p. 12)
In summary, risk is central to TDR certification but has not received as much critical attention
as other concepts such as trust, and the overall value proposition of TDR certification remains an
open question.

2.3 Risk and Uncertainty

Risk is foundational to TRAC certification (Frank, 2022; McHugh, 2012). In many cases, and
particularly in digital preservation, discourse about risk relies on a deterministic view which
assumes risks are knowable and calculable. A classical understanding of risk holds that it is a
combination of the probability and consequences of an event (e.g., International Organization for
Standardization Technical Committee, 2018; Leveson et al., 2009; Royal Society (Great Britain)
and Study Group on Risk, 1983).
Scholarship in digital preservation has tended to focus on this view of risk as calculable and
knowable (e.g., Barateiro et al., 2010; Saffady, 2020; Vermaaten et al., 2012). Yet, research
across a broad spectrum of disciplines has argued that risk is socially constructed (e.g., Burgess,
2015; Hilgartner, 1992), that social factors influence how people construct their understanding of
risk (e.g., Bankoff and Hilhorst, 2009; Nelkin, 1989; Perrow, 1999; Slovic, 1987; Vaughan,
1996), and that the social construction of risk is relevant for digital preservation (Frank, 2020).
Uncertainty has been shown to influence perceptions of risk (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982).
Scholars have argued that risk calculations which take place under conditions of speculation
and/or ignorance represent uncertainty about the probability or consequences of a threat (van Est
et al., 2012; Starr, 2003). Silver defines uncertainty as “risk that is hard to measure” (Silver,
2012, p. 29). More recently, scholars have argued that it is more productive to discuss risks
themselves as uncertain because the dichotomy between probability and consequences is flawed:
“current risk assessment is mostly future-oriented. The basis for risk assessment, therefore, has
shifted from probability, based on experience in the past, to possibility, based on expectations
about the future” (van Est et al., 2012, p. 1077). In this view, probability and magnitude cannot
be separated when considering uncertainty for risk. Rather, these elements combine to make risks
themselves uncertain.
In the context of assessments of technical systems, “uncertainties compound the difficulties of
risk evaluation and leave considerable leeway for subjective factors to enter both scientific
interpretations and public perceptions” (Nelkin, 1989, p. 97). Nelkin also argues that fundamental
uncertainties in technology “defy systematic analysis” and that the “effort to quantify risks and
benefits masks real technical uncertainties” (Nelkin, 1989, p. 100). For TRAC certification, this
means that (1) uncertainties about how to assess and mitigate risks create space for the
requirements to be interpreted differently by different actors, and (2) efforts to quantify risks will
obscure existing uncertainties.
This is particularly relevant with regard to the requirement that repositories understand their
DC. Given how central the understanding of a repository’s DC is for the TRAC requirements,
and the necessity of understanding the DC for the risk assessment activities that the checklist
represents, it follows that uncertainty about the DC will influence how stakeholders in this
process will construct their understanding of risk.
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3

Research Methods

This qualitative study is part of a larger research project whose goal is to understand how
stakeholders in the TRAC repository certification process construct their understanding of risk
for long-term digital preservation. This project involves 44 interviews with standard developers,
auditors, and repository staff members. In this paper we report on results 19 of those interviews,
focusing on those individuals who discussed the concept of the DC in their interview. This study
was reviewed and deemed “not regulated” by the Institutional Review Board at the first author’s
university.

3.1 Sites and Participants

At the time of data collection for the study in 2016, there were six TRAC certified repositories.
Of those, four were certified for their entire repository: Canadiana.org, Chronopolis, HathiTrust,
and Portico (Center for Research Libraries, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015). Two were certified for only
their e-journal content: Scholars Portal and CLOCKSS (Center for Research Libraries, 2013,
2014, 2018). These repositories and their certification processes formed the sites for this study.
The participants for this research came from three groups consisting of (1) developers of the
ISO 16363 standard, (2) auditors, and (3) three to five staff members from each TRAC certified
repository. Standard developers as a group consists of people who participated in the
development and maintenance of the ISO 16363 standard. These individuals held a range of
professional roles and affiliations. The group of auditors consists of people who were staff
members at CRL as well as people from CRL member organizations who were invited to
participate in the audit process. The group of repository staff members consists of people who
worked at the six repositories listed above and were involved in their repository’s TRAC audit
process in some way.
Table I below shows a breakdown of the interviewees included in this study.
Table I. Interviewees by category and role (N = 19).

Standard Developers
Auditors
Repository Staff
Total

Repository
Administration
0
1
1
2

Roles

Digital
Preservation
7
4
2
13

IT
3
0
1
4

Total
10
5
4
19

3.2 Data Collection

Interviews lasting one to two hours were conducted with all participants. Each interview
consisted of two sections. First, participants were presented with a brief vignette which was sent
ahead of the interview (Frank, 2018). The vignette consisted of a sample repository description,
which was generated based on the text of the ISO 16363 standard as well as the six TRACcertified repositories. Interviewees were asked to discuss the repository described in the vignette,
and to identify potential sources of risk based on the information presented. The vignette allowed
for common ground across the interviewees, and is a useful interview strategy when working
with research participants who are highly visible or identifiable within their communities – as
these interviewees were likely to be (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001).
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The second half of the interviews consisted of questions about each participant’s own
experience with TDR certification. Participants were asked questions about the audit and
certification process and were also asked to identify and discuss potential sources of risk for
TDRs.
All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for analysis.

3.3 Data Analysis

Interview transcripts were coded in NVivo, a qualitative data analysis package. We employed an
open coding approach consisting of descriptive, thematic, and analytic codes. In first round
analysis interview transcripts were coded in two groups: standard developers and auditors, and
repository staff members. For each, two coders worked together to achieve an acceptable
interrater reliability score. We reached a Scott’s pi of 0.719 for the standard developers and
auditors and 0.711 for the repository staff members (Craig, 1981; Scott, 1955). The code set for
this analysis consisted of codes relating to potential sources of risk, factors that influence risk
perception, digital preservation, and the TRAC audit process.
After this initial round of analysis, we examined the data further, focusing on the topics of
DC, risk, and uncertainty. A single team member conducted the secondary analysis.

3.4 Limitations

Participants in this research experienced some problems with memory and recall (Sudman et al.,
1996). In order to address these issues, we sent interviewees copies of their audit reports, and
suggested that they review their own documentation and calendars before, during, and after each
interview. Social desirability and expectancy effects likely occurred, given the small size of the
total population for this research (Bernard, 2013). Deference effects and inaccuracy in self
reporting were most likely also present (Bernard, 2013). The vignette portion of the interviews
was included in part to offset some of these limitations.

4

Findings

We organize our findings into three themes based on our analysis: (1) the foundational role of the
DC in TRAC certification, (2) uncertainty about the concept of the DC, and (3) the DC as a
potential source of risk.
Findings from this research demonstrate that while the concept of the DC is considered
foundational for TRAC certification among interviewees who discussed it, it is also a source of
uncertainty for auditors and repository staff in the context of an audit. Uncertainty about how
repositories should identify their DCs influences how stakeholders in this process construct their
understanding of risk in the context of TRAC certification.

4.1 Designated Community: A Keystone for Trustworthy Digital Repositories

DCs were widely described by interviewees as foundational for TDRs, which aligns with the
expectations set by the OAIS model and the TRAC/ISO 16363 standard as described above.
While interview questions did not specifically ask about DCs, 10 of the 11 standard
developers, 5 of the 10 auditors, and 4 of the 22 repository staff members discussed this concept
in their interviews, which were focused on discussing risk for digital repositories. In other words,
nearly all of the standard developers and half of the auditors brought up the concept of the DC
when they were asked to identify and discuss potential sources of risk for digital repositories in
the context of TRAC certification, but only a small number of the repository staff members
mentioned it.
Standard developers and auditors discussed the DC in ways that emphasized its’ centrality,
which reflected the view of the DC that the standard developers advance in the TRAC
8

documentation. Among standard developers, a common theme that arose during interviews was
the idea that the DC must be well-understood by repository management, and that having a welldefined DC would help a repository to mitigate potential risks:
“The Designated Community has to be visible to the management of the repository
and has to be available, essentially, for assurance that the repository’s strategies are in
keeping with the Designated Community’s desires … if you’ve got a Designated
Community and they’re keeping you honest, then many of the other problems are
fairly easy to deal with.” (Standard Developer 01)
Similarly, standard developers explained that it was important for an audit team to include
someone who is familiar with and understands the repository’s DC: “It would be nice to have, as
part of that team, one or more of the team members be familiar with the Designated Community
for those archives and have an understanding of those areas” (Standard Developer 08).
Another perspective from standard developers that emphasized the importance of the DC
came from Standard Developer 03, whose primary role was focused on digital preservation. This
interviewee explained that in order to improve their documentation to become TRAC certified,
the repository described in the vignette would need to clearly identify and describe not just the
membership of the DC but also their KB, and then take the extra step of confirming that
information with members of the DC:
“Well the first one they’d need to have a clear statement of what their mission is and
what they are and aren’t going to take in. And who their Designated Community is,
what the Knowledge Base of that Designated Community is, and ensure - get some
feedback from the members of the group that they think make up their Designated
Community to see if they’re right.” (Standard Developer 03)
These perspectives demonstrate that for standard developers in the TRAC certification
system, it is crucial for repositories to know and understand their DC, and to be in contact with
representatives from that DC in order to understand whether their policies and practices meet the
needs of that DC.
Auditors shared a similar perspective. During their interviews both Auditors 04 and 09
explained that they came to understand the importance of the DC for TRAC certification through
their experience as auditors, interpreting and applying the TRAC standard as written by the
standard developers. For example, “the more I worked on the CRL audits the more important that
notion of a Designated Community became in my mind” (Auditor 04).
This shows that the importance of the DC was something auditors learned in the review
process. Repository staff members also found that auditors were very focused on the DC, “I think
that the auditors are very attuned to the Designated Community” (Repository Staff 06).
In addition to explicitly describing a well-defined DC as important, interviewees framed their
belief about the importance of the DC in terms of problems that could arise when this information
is missing. Standard Developers 03, 05, 06, 07, 09, 11; Auditors 02, 04, 05, 10; and Repository
Staff 07, 17, and 18 all expressed a belief that a lack of understanding about a repository’s DC
would be an impediment for certification for the repository described in the vignette. Standard
Developer 05 explained that a clear explanation of the DC is a prerequisite for understanding a
repository’s digital object management:
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“I think that the first thing, with reference to the Digital Object Management, should
be what is your Designated Community? You must know exactly why you preserve
what, for whom? This must be well defined.” (Standard Developer 05)
Auditor 03 stated that they would need to have a clear picture of the DC in order to
understand the repository. In other words, the ability to understand a repository well enough to
assess it for trustworthiness would depend ultimately on how well the DC was defined:
“I think in order to really understand what the repository is, what they are, who they
serve, I really would need to understand a little bit more about who they’re preserving
for.” (Auditor 03)
For both Standard Developer 05 and Auditor 03, it was not possible to understand whether
the repository in the vignette had appropriate processes for managing digital information, that
would address potential risks, without knowing who the repository was preserving that
information for. Although interviewees focused more on the DC as consisting of people than
systems or non-human actors this largely aligns with the definition of the DC discussed
previously, as the consumers who should be able to understand the information being preserved
by the repository. In light of this alignment, it makes sense that it would be necessary to
understand that DC in order to know whether the policies and practices will be appropriate for
them.

4.2 Uncertainty

Despite the importance of the DC for TDRs, interviewees expressed a substantial amount of
uncertainty about this concept. While the importance of the DC was primarily discussed by
standard developers and auditors, interviewees across all three groups (i.e., standard developers,
auditors, and repository staff members) agreed that the DC is a source of uncertainty in the
TRAC audit process.
Standard developers noted that repositories in their test audits tended to have trouble defining
a DC. Standard Developer 01 explained that uncertainty about the DC was a common theme
across all the repositories they reviewed, and that uncertainty about how repositories should go
about defining their DC is a weakness of the OAIS model:
“Probably the most frequent was that they didn’t have a good description of their
Designated Community, and none of them would admit to ever having a meeting of
representatives of the Designated Community … The idea that the Designated
Community is the basis for all the actions that all the preservation has done, that idea
didn’t really have currency then, and I’m not sure that it does yet. If there’s a real
weakness in the OAIS model, it’s that we don’t have a good handle on how to, how
we can advise repositories to produce or create a usable Designated Community or
form an organization to represent a Designated Community. We don’t discuss that at
all, we just assume that they should know that already.” (Standard Developer 01)
Indeed, uncertainty about the DC was a common theme across interviews. We organize these
uncertainties into two categories: uncertainty about how to define and understand DCs, and
uncertainty about how to monitor the KB of the DC over time.
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4.2.1 Defining and Understanding Designated Communities

Several standard developers discussed the difficulty that repositories had in establishing a clear
picture of their DC that they could communicate to auditors. When discussing the test audits that
they conducted while developing the TRAC standard, standard developers found that the
repositories were lacking clear explanations of their DCs. Standard developers 06 and 09 both
said that repositories they reviewed had failed to differentiate the DC from their current users:
“You could tell it was not really fully addressing the preservation concerns that it
should be addressing. Again, it was focused on current use and meeting current user
demands. Well, your Designated Community has to include users who haven’t even
been born yet. You have to have a way in which you can ensure, guarantee, that you
can preserve that information a half century, a full century, four centuries into the
future.” (Standard Developer 06)
In failing to frame this as the DC and instead talking about their current users, the staff of the
repositories in these test audits demonstrated that they did not understand how important the
concept of the DC was for certification.
Repository staff members discussed challenges that they encountered in clearly defining their
repository’s DC. Repository Staff 07 explained that the audit process pushed the repository to
more fully document policies that they had taken for granted, “we sort of assumed we had them
we just didn’t have them written down.” The DC was one of those policies: “we hadn’t even
realized that those were areas where we hadn’t put any thought into it” (Repository Staff 07).
Once it became clear that the repository needed a clear definition of their DC, they realized that
they also needed a much more specific definition:
“We spent a lot of time defining our Designated Community because we’ve always
done it very broadly and when you start actually looking at certifying a repository
you start to realize well you actually you have to be a lot more specific, and I think,
constrained about what that is.” (Repository Staff 07)
In addition to defining the DC, another area of uncertainty for interviewees was how
repositories should go about understanding and meeting the needs of their DCs. Repository staff
members explained that their organizations experienced difficulties articulating the link between
repository policies and practices and the DC. For Repository Staff 18, bringing repository
governance into alignment with the expectations of a diverse DC was difficult: “It’s complicated,
the governance and managing expectation of a diverse Designated Community is complicated in
a certain way.”
Auditors recognized that the lack of clear definition of the DC led to uncertainty about other
policies and practices. Uncertainty about the DC led to problems in other repository policies,
such as the scope of the collection and policies governing decisions about what to accept and
ingest to the repository:
“I would say the biggest issue was the [repository] audit was the role of that
organization and its Designated Community … We needed some clarity around what
that Designated Community looked like. And it was a little bit unclear, too, what their
mandate was in terms of the breadth of the types of material that they would seek to
ingest.” (Auditor 08)
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For standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members, the concept of the DC was
met with uncertainty. In the context of a TRAC audit, members from all three groups described
instances in which staff members of digital repositories were uncertain about how to apply the
concept of the DC to their repository and/or about how to define their own DC. Auditors and
repository staff members also described instances in which a lack of understanding about the DC
led to uncertainty in other areas of repository management such as governance and collection
management decisions.

4.2.2 The Knowledge Base of the Designated Community

In addition to defining the DC and developing an understanding of their needs, repositories that
seek TRAC certification must also monitor the KB of their DCs in order to ensure that they are
preserving information in a way that will be understandable over time.
Monitoring the KB of the DC was described as both a source and result of uncertainty. For
repository staff members, uncertainty about how to define their DC could lead to problems in
understanding the KB of that DC. Alternately, changes in the KB of the DC over time were also
described as something that could create uncertainty for digital repositories.
Discussions about monitoring the KB of the DC over time demonstrated uncertainty among
interviewees about the concept of the DC. For example, Standard Developer 09 explained that
although understanding the DC and making preservation decisions that align with the KB of that
DC is crucial for TRAC certification, it is difficult to do in practice and in his opinion it would be
fine for repositories to instead set policies based on the needs of their current users:
“[A] Designated Community is a fundamental idea, but it’s very difficult to do in
practice. Repositories often think in terms of their current user base, which is fine as
long as they also have in mind that the future users, the Designated Community, may
have a different Knowledge Base.” (Standard Developer 09)
This highlights the importance of understanding a DC as separate and distinct from a
repository’s current users in order to make preservation decisions that take the KB of the DC into
account. This perspective was particularly salient for standard developers, who emphasized the
difference between the DC and a repository’s current users in the OAIS model and TRAC
checklist.

4.3 Risk

Lack of clarity about a concept that was understood as foundational for the TRAC audit process
was described as a source of risk for digital repositories. Interviewees discussed this uncertainty
as a risk to the repositories and the digital information that they sought to preserve.
A lack of understanding about the DC for a repository was viewed as a problem because it
was an indication of potentially inconsistent policies and practices. For example, Standard
Developer 03 and Repository Staff 18 explained that a lack of clarity about the DC could
ultimately result in a repository that was not meeting the needs of users and could therefore
threaten funding, “the foundational risk is that they haven’t identified what exactly they’re going
to keep and how long they’re going to keep it and who they’re going to keep it for. And so over
the long term that can have an impact on your funding and the viability of the repository …
there’s an existential risk to the repository” (Standard Developer 03).
Interviewees also discussed the concept of the DC as malleable. For several interviewees,
successful TRAC certification was a result of carefully defining a repository’s DC in a way that
would justify current policies and practices, even when they ran counter to the recommendations
in the TRAC standard. Standard Developer 01 and Repository Staff 18 both described situations
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in which repositories justified preservation policies regarding data backups that failed to conform
to best practices as set by the TRAC standard by arguing that they met the expectations of their
DCs. The repositories that they were describing both achieved TRAC certification.

4.3.1 Designated Community Composition, Expectations, and Knowledge
Base

As discussed above, the DC is foundational for TRAC certification. Interviewees described the
DC as the basis for repository policies and practices, and said that repositories wishing to become
TRAC certified would be evaluated in terms of how well their policies and practices met the
needs and expectations of their DCs. A well-defined DC was described as “the starting point of
any OAIS-based repository” (Standard Developer 01).
In light of the substantial role that the DC plays in repository certification, uncertainty about
the membership of a repository’s DC and/or about the needs and expectations of the DC was
viewed as a source of risk for the long-term preservation of digital content. Standard developers
01, 03, 05, and 09, and Auditor 02 all identified the lack of a clearly defined as a potential source
of risk for the repository in the vignette: “There’s no information about who the community is
and what they would expect, and I think that’s a flag” (Auditor 02).
Standard Developer 05 explained that many elements of digital preservation are put at risk
when the DC is not clearly articulated:
“If you don’t know exactly the reason and the focus, you are not able to define the
level of granularity of your description. Of your data management. You are not able to
define what has to be received when you have this and what has to be added and
which kind of documentation, and information, you have to put on when you give
access in the future, also immediately, to the users. Which kind of users? How to
create this chain if you don’t have clear ideas what you’re doing for whom?”
(Standard Developer 05)
When discussing the vignette, Standard Developer 09 found inconsistencies in the preferred
format policy and thought this was evidence that the DC was not well-understood. According to
this interviewee, uncertainty about file formats was a potential source of risk for the repository
because it demonstrated a lack of understanding about the expectations of the DC:
“The risk here is that the expectations of users do not match what the repository is
providing in terms of support for preferred versus non-preferred formats … So for
me, that’s a risk. It suggests that the Designated Community is not really understood.”
(Standard Developer 09)
The above statement demonstrates the expectation of standard developers that the DC forms the
basis of policy decisions within repositories. Repository policies and practices that were not
internally consistent, or that seemed to conflict with one another were indicators of risk for this
interviewee.
Communication about repository policies was described as an important way to manage
expectations with a repository’s membership, in part by explaining the DC, to contextualize
policies and practices. Auditor 08 explained that repositories could offset some problems by
minimizing uncertainty through good communication practices:
“It’s really important to communicate, in this case, this is the Designated Community.
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The organization has to really have a good foundation in communicating with that
Designated Community and making sure that there’s consensus that those changes
and those clarifications are good and supported and solid.” (Auditor 08)
Lack of clarity about the DC was described as a threat not just to the digital content in a
repository, but to the repository itself. Auditor 08 and Repository Staff 18 explained that a
repository that lacked a clear picture of their DC was at risk of losing the support of their user
community:
“[T]he foundational risk is that they haven’t identified what exactly they’re going to
keep and how long they’re going to keep it and who they’re going to keep it for. And
so over the long term that can have an impact on your funding and the viability of the
repository. Because if you’re not meeting the needs of your customers, your funding the membership dues - will decrease, grant funding will go away. So there’s an
existential risk to the repository.” (Standard Developer 03)
Repository Staff 18 explained further, that in addition to needing to know if they were meeting
the needs of the DC, it was also important to know how the repository was viewed, and what
expectations the DC would have about a repository’s infrastructure and services. Understanding
how a repository can remain relevant to the DC was crucial:
“From my perspective the most significant risk is just the lack of clarity around the
mandate. Because basically the whole rest of everything kind of falls out of that.
Needing to know what, how the members of the Designated Community view the
repository. Is it a core piece of their operating infrastructure? Is it something they’re
just throwing money at in order to say, ‘yeah, we’re dealing with preservation, it’s
this thing over here?’ We’d need to know that because it’s that, that all the other
pieces that are risky are going to hang off of.” (Repository Staff 18)
In addition to the composition and expectations of a DC, interviewees discussed uncertainty
about changes to the KB over time as a potential source of risk. When asked about sources of
uncertainty for digital repositories, Standard Developer 09 discussed monitoring the KB in order
to be aware of changes over time: “Future technology, I guess. And I guess, changes in the
community that you’re trying to support” (Standard Developer 09).
For TRAC certification, interviewees identified risk in the ways that repositories did, or did
not, understand, define, and monitor the needs of their DCs. Interviewees across tall three groups
(i.e., standard developers, auditors, and repository staff members) argued that a lack of clarity
about DC would be a risk to the long-term preservation of digital content, and to the financial
sustainability of a repository.

4.3.2 Using the Designated Community to Justify Sub-Optimal Policies and
Practices

The lack of clarity about how to identify and describe a DC was also a source of risk for
repositories because it created opportunities for stakeholders in the TRAC process to justify suboptimal preservation policies and practices.
Several interviewees expressed a strong belief that a repository could justify any kind of
policies or practices, even if those policies were in direct contrast to the OAIS model and TRAC
requirements, if they could claim that it met the expectations of their DC. For example,
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Repository Staff 18 described a situation in which a repository received certification despite
failing to meet data backup requirements because they argued that their DC was ok with what
they were doing:
“On some level, there were some conversations that we had where they were really
pushing for a technical, the example I would give is: our off-site back-ups. We have
backups and we have off-site backups. Our off-site back-ups were not what they
deemed to be sufficiently far away … And through quite a lot of research and hand
wringing and the like, we sort of came around to the idea that there aren’t really wellestablished standards for this. It’s sort of based on risk management and risk
mitigation and so I think they were lobbying fairly hard for a solution that was a
given distance away. And I think there was some question as to whether or not they’re
the ones to dictate that to us ... I actually don’t think that’s the role of the auditor. I
think that’s the role of the Designated Community. If they have concerns that it’s not
enough then I think it’s their role to ask the Designated Community if they think it’s
enough.” (Repository Staff 18).
Standard Developer 01 said that the backup strategy of the repository in the vignette was not
sufficient, but also if it met the expectations of the DC then it would be fine. This attitude is a
paradox in repository certification. The goal of certification is to assess repositories and provide
an assessment by experts in order to help data depositors, repository users, and funders to know
whether the repositories are trustworthy because regular users don’t have specialist knowledge
about how repositories should preserve content. But the certification process has a clause that
allows auditors and repository staff to do anything as long as they claim that it is expected by the
DC – a group of people who may not understand enough about preservation to know if the
services provided are sufficient and trustworthy, “I guess, again, it’s a matter of what the
Designated Community wants us to do, but active mirror backup sites are not in and of
themselves ... They’re not sufficient” (Standard Developer 01).
Auditor 04 was even more explicit, and said that he learned through the audit process that
repositories which fell short of meeting the best practices described in the TRAC standard could
still become TRAC certified if they argued that the repository was meeting the expectations of
the DC: “As long as your policies adhere to what your Designated Community expects, then it’s
basically cool” (Auditor 04).
Repository Staff 06 and 07 both identified the bit-level preservation described in the vignette
as a potential source of risk, but argued that this would still be acceptable as long as the
repository did not promise more: “Yeah, if all you promise is bit-level of preservation, for
anything you want to put in there and it’s encrypted and whatever, then good enough”
(Repository Staff 06).
Repository Staff 07 went on to explain that this approach – to manage expectations in order to
justify particular approaches to digital preservation – was still potentially problematic, because it
would be difficult to fully explain the implications of bit-level preservation to people without
expertise in digital preservation:
“I think the more low-level and basic what you’re proposing to do is, the more careful
you have to actually be about managing expectations and understandings of what it is
that you’re actually promising. There’s nothing wrong with bit level preservation but
making your depositors and your Designated Communities actually understand what
the implications of bit level preservation could be, I think may be potentially more
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challenging.” (Repository Staff 07)
So far we have discussed how interviewees use the DC to justify preservation policies and
practices that may be risky with regard to long-term preservation. Interviewees also described
situations in which a repository could meet the requirements for certification by changing the
definition of their DC rather than changing policies to meet the needs and expectations of their
stated DC: “that’s easy to fix because all you have to do is to be more precise about his
Designated Community” (Standard Developer 07).
Standard Developer 07 went on to explain that broadening the scope of the DC could be a
way for a repository to acquire support and resources, suggesting a strategic, extractive view of
the DC:
“If you can increase the value, broaden the community of users, so not the Designated
Community, but the community of users who can clearly use the data, then eventually
you might broaden your Designated Community … Then you can start building
business cases and justify the resources that go into preservation.” (Standard
Developer 07)
A repository whose policies and documentation do not align with their DC was described as a
red flag in an audit, and a signal of risk for the long-term preservation of content and to the
repository itself. However, in many cases interviewees described ways that repositories could
subvert the TRAC requirements by arguing that their DCs either expected or were willing to
accept policies and practices that fell short of the requirements, or by redefining the DC to fit
what the repository was doing, rather than working to meet the needs and expectations of the DC.

5

Discussion

The DC is a foundational element of the OAIS model and the TRAC certification requirements
(Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems, 2011, 2012). Despite the importance of the
DC, it is a poorly understood concept that repository staff members have difficulty implementing
in the context of their own repository (e.g., Bettivia, 2016; Boutard, 2020; Moles, 2022; Parsons
and Duerr, 2006). This study expanded the discussion to include an examination of the role that
the DC played in the certification process for all six of the TRAC certified repositories.
We already know that both scholars and practitioners find the DC to be a problematic concept
for digital repositories. This article contributes to the discussion about DCs by interrogating the
relationship between DCs, repository certification, and risk.
As early as 2006, scholars such as Parsons and Duerr criticized the concept of the DC as too
narrow (Parsons and Duerr, 2006). Since that time, others have noted that the concept is difficult
to implement (e.g., Donaldson, 2020), and that it forces institutions that serve broad publics to
instead narrow their focus to a specific set of potential consumers (e.g., Bettivia, 2016). Scholars
have also argued that by focusing on a narrowly-defined DC, repositories risk failing to provide
meaningful access to digital information for more broadly conceptualized user communities
(Boutard, 2020; Moles, 2022).
Scholars, such as Moles (2022) and Bettivia (2016), have argued that repositories seeking to
strictly implement the requirement for a clearly defined DC which guides preservation strategy
can lead repositories to implement exclusionary practices that conflict with their professional
ethics. While this study finds that the concept of the DC was viewed by some TRAC certification
stakeholders in this way – as a tool to narrow the focus of preservation strategies to meet the
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needs of a particular group of people – we found that others viewed the concept of a DC as a
malleable and changeable way to justify a range of preservation strategies.
Our findings that interviewees justify policies and practices that conflict with the TRAC
requirements by appealing to their DC begs the question of whether members of a repository’s
DC possess sufficient expertise in long-term digital preservation to disregard widely accepted
best practices. One of the purposes of TRAC certification is to demonstrate to repository
stakeholders that the organization is trustworthy for long-term preservation by having experts
examine the repository, so that current and future repository users can understand whether a
repository is trustworthy without having to become experts in digital preservation. Circumventing
the requirements of the TRAC standard by explaining that non-experts are willing to accept subpar preservation practices, without demonstrating that those people understand best practices,
introduces risk to the long-term preservation of digital information as well as to the sustainability
of the repository itself.
Choices about preservation strategies such as file formats, metadata, and contextual
information should understandably be guided by the DC. However, we argue here that
preservation strategies, such as data backup policies, should also be guided by expertise and best
practices in digital preservation. Implementing strategies that conflict with accepted best
practices in digital preservation, based on the expectations of a DC lacking in expertise about this
topic, introduces uncertainty and risk to both the digital content and the repository itself.
Likewise, it brings into question the value of TRAC certification if repositories with strategies
that fail to meet the requirements described in the standard can still achieve certification.

6

Conclusion

7
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